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Abstract 
In the aftermath of civil war or violent internal conflict, one of the key peace-building 
challenges is the reconciliation of former enemies who are members of the same small-
scale societies. A failure of social reintegration may contribute to what is known as a 
conflict trap. To detect lingering hostile attitudes among a community’s various factions is 
crucial, but the approaches adopted in previous studies tend to focus on the impact of 
conflict on one or other aggregated indicator of social cohesion rather than on how 
violence-affected individuals regard and act towards their fellow community members. 
Here we demonstrate the value of concentrating on this latter dyadic component of social 
interactions and use behavioural experiments and a social tie survey to assess, in an 
appropriately disaggregated manner, social cohesion in a post-conflict setting in northern 
Uganda. Whereas in self-reported surveys, ex-combatants appear to be well-connected, 
active members of their communities, the experiments unveil the continued reluctance of 
other community members to share or cooperate with them; fewer resources are committed 
to ex-combatants than to others, which is statistically significant. The dyadic nature of our 
analysis allows us to detect which groups are more prone to discriminate against ex-
combatants, which may help facilitate targeted interventions. 
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Introduction 
Post-conflict social reintegration may hold the key to lasting peace. We know that internal 
civil conflicts have large, negative effects on prosperity (e.g. Rodrik, 1999; Murdoch & 
Sandler, 2002; Murdoch & Sandler, 2004; Chen, Loayza & Reynal-Querol, 2008; Cerra & 
Saxena, 2008). A failure of social reintegration may reinforce and entrench the effects of 
the resulting poverty, giving rise to a cyclical conflict trap, in which material hardship 
along with enduring hostile sentiments breeds future violence that perpetuates under-
development, and so on (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2006; DeRouen & 
Bercovitch, 2008). 
A key mechanism in the conflict trap stems from fractured societies. Conflicts have 
made enemies of people who should for the good of their communities live, work and trade 
peacefully together, but who may not be willing or psychologically able to do so, once 
arms have been laid down. Increasingly, post-conflict social reintegration is seen, both in 
the academic and in the policy literature, as an essential condition for lasting peace (UNDP, 
2001; Collier et al., 2003; Paris, 2004; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Spear, 2006; Del Castillo, 
2008; Özerdem, 2012) and peace agreements that end internal conflicts now typically 
contain social reintegration programmes to prevent the disenfranchisement of ex-
combatants and thereby reduce the likelihood of a future outbreak of conflict (Berdal & 
Ucko, 2009; Knight, 2010). 
The corresponding research challenge is to measure the extent to which social 
reintegration has taken place in the years following the end of conflict. One way of 
conceptualising social reintegration is to think of it as former enemies regarding and acting 
towards each other no differently than they do towards other community members. In this 
study, we quantify attitudes towards each other of community members engaged in a 
process of post-conflict reintegration. Our innovation is to match individuals on the roles 
they played in the recently ended conflict. We evaluate post-conflict social reintegration 
by concentrating on the social connections between pairs of individuals (dyads) who are 
purposively matched on conflict roles. For this purpose we designed a measurement 
instrument that we believe to be useful for assessing the extent to which post-conflict 
reintegration has taken place. 
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We selected northern Uganda as the setting for this study. The specifics of the twenty 
years of civil war that started in the late 1980s meant that no self-selection into conflict 
roles took place: fighters were abducted by and indoctrinated into a rebel movement with 
virtually no popular support, and taught to terrorise the civilian population, including their 
own relatives and community members. As demonstrated for this civil war by Blattman & 
Annan (2010), this absence of self-selection greatly reduces concern about potentially 
confounding factors: whereas factors such as ethnicity and religion are often correlated 
with conflict roles, this was not the case in the recently ended civil war in northern Uganda. 
As a result, the value of our instrument in detecting a lingering distaste for cooperating and 
sharing with former enemies can be more readily seen: other identity markers do not blur 
the picture.1 
We used behavioural experiments in which subjects are matched on past conflict roles 
in a double-blind procedure so that neither they nor the experiment instructors know the 
reason for the pairing. Within matched pairs, we assess willingness to cooperate and 
willingness to share. Incentives are substantial: subjects would typically have to work 
several days to earn the money they leave the experiment with. For triangulation, a social 
tie survey is conducted immediately after the experiments that asks respondents to self-
report the nature of their relationship with the individuals they were paired with in the 
experiments. In order to complement the data on dyads, i.e. the experiments and social tie 
surveys, we administered a questionnaire to participants for collecting socio-economic, 
demographic and conflict history data. We also conducted key informant interviews to help 
us prepare for the fieldwork, as well as interpret our findings. 
We find that about 15 percent fewer resources are committed to ex-combatants than to 
other community members, both in the sharing and in the cooperation experiments. This is 
in marked contrast to the findings from our social tie survey, in which ex-combatants 
appear to be as well-connected as everybody else. This suggests that behavioural 
experiments are good at capturing attitudes that people are reluctant to verbalise or in this 
case perhaps more plausibly hold unconsciously, because of an officially promoted norm 
of reconciliation: of forgiving and not discriminating against former enemies. Lab-in-the-
                                                 
1
 At the same time, it is clear that the young were preferred to the old, and among the young, males to females 
by the rebel movement: we control for age and gender in the analysis. 
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field experiments are increasingly used for research on discriminatory attitudes that, if 
expressed, may meet with psychological resistance or objections from others;2 our findings 
point to the field of post-conflict social reintegration as providing avenues for potentially 
fruitful extensions of such research. 
The dyadic nature of our analysis also allows further probing of these results: we know 
which groups are particularly prone to discriminate against ex-combatants. We interpret 
the pattern of discrimination we find in terms of Tajfel & Turner’s (1979, 1986) social 
identity theory of intergroup behaviour and conflict. We argue that blame, resentment or 
conflict-related acquired personal characteristics are in context not plausible to explain the 
evidence for discrimination we find. Instead, we advance the explanation that conflict has 
created new social categories and therefore opportunities for categorical thinking: in-group 
favouritism and discrimination against the outgroup. Although their participation in the 
conflict was involuntary (they were forcibly abducted and forced to fight), ex-combatants 
have become an outgroup because of their conflict roles, which results in discrimination. 
The article proceeds as follows. We first describe the literature related to our study, and 
briefly elaborate theoretical predictions for attitudes towards other categories of conflict 
participants in a post-conflict setting. Next we describe the research setting and methods 
for testing these predictions. This is followed by a presentation of our results, which are 
discussed in a concluding section. 
 
Related literature and theoretical framework  
Contribution to the literature 
In this study, we contribute to two literatures. The first is studies that quantify social 
cohesion and reintegration in post-conflict settings. Previously, these have mainly relied 
on survey-based measures of trust in community members, of social and political activity, 
and of density of community-based associations. Generally speaking, aggregate proxy 
measures are used of social cohesion from various parts or periods of a conflict-affected 
area and the intertemporal or regional differences are taken as a measure of conflict’s 
impact on such cohesion. Some find negative effects of conflict on interpersonal trust and 
                                                 
2
 A good illustration are recent experimental studies on the gendered intra-household allocation of resources 
such as Iversen et al. (2011), Jackson (2013), Kebede et al. (2014) and Munro et al. (2014). 
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cooperation (Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Thapa, 2003; Deng, 2010; Rohner et al., 2011; 
Cassar, Grosjean & Whitt, 2013; De Luca & Verpoorten, 2015), whereas others find 
positive effects of exposure to conflict on social cohesion, when that is proxied by 
participation in social activities, political engagement and community-level altruism 
(Bellows & Miguel, 2006; Blattman, 2009; Voors et al., 2012).  
The positive signs of social reintegration often found in these studies are good news but 
should also be met with some scepticism. Self-reported trust in community members may 
be subject to social desirability bias, which is especially pertinent when community leaders, 
NGOs and government are actively promoting peace; there is social pressure on people to 
conform to officially promoted norms. Social and political activity may be as much 
evidence of wishing to be accepted, or perhaps to make amends for past actions, as 
evidence of having been accepted. Associational density measures are aggregate proxies 
of what goes on between people, not based on direct observation of social connections; 
they may thus fail to detect lingering hostility present in some of these connections.    
We side-step the limitations of the associational density and social and political activity 
measures by concentrating directly on the social interaction between individuals engaged 
in a process of reintegration. We attempt to overcome social desirability bias by using 
behavioural experiments that make it costly to conform with a norm of displaying no 
discrimination towards former enemies, when this is contrary to true preferences.3 The set-
up is thus designed to elicit behaviour that naturally comes without the interference of 
social desirability. 
In addition to the literature that measures post-conflict social reintegration, we also 
contribute to experimental studies of social preferences in post-conflict settings. Echoing 
the surveys cited above, these have often found positive effects of conflict: on trust 
(Gilligan, Pasquale & Samii, 2013; Cassar, Grosjean & Whitt, 2013), trustworthiness 
(Becchetti, Conzo & Romeo, 2013), altruism (Voors et al., 2012), cooperation (Gilligan, 
                                                 
3
 When asking sensitive questions in surveys, respondents may be reluctant to reveal socially undesirable 
attitudes, either to avoid embarrassment or because of incomplete cognitive processing (De Leeuw, 2005; 
Tourangeau & Yan, 2007; Van de Mortel, 2008; Kaminska & Foulsham, 2016). The latter, incomplete 
cognitive processing, would in our application correspond with unconsciously held attitudes towards former 
enemies. Experimental techniques have previously been used to help overcome social desirability bias (SDB) 
in surveys: to validate survey questions about which there are SDB concerns (Moshagen et al., 2013), and to 
reveal the discrepancy between evidence of socially undesirable behaviour based on responses to a survey 
and evidence of such behaviour  obtained using an experiment (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). 
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Pasquale & Samii, 2013) and the resilience of fairness norms (Whitt & Wilson, 2007). At 
the same time, conflict experience has been linked to increased favouritism of the in-group 
(“parochialism”) (Bauer et al., 2013), which however diminishes through frequent non-
threatening post-conflict interactions with members of other groups (Alexander & Christia, 
2011).  
We add to these studies two innovations that we believe are crucial for quantifying post-
conflict social reintegration in a suitably disaggregated manner. The first is the purposive 
matching: by matching subjects from conflict-affected small-scale societies on conflict 
roles, which has not so far been done, we focus on the relationships that turned sour during 
the conflict, and the restoring of which forms the essence of post-conflict social 
reintegration. The second is the double-blind procedure, described below, which ensures 
that the effects on cooperation and sharing we find are not driven by experimenter demand 
effects: neither experimental subjects nor the assistants conducting the experiments are 
informed about anybody’s conflict history, so that we rely on subjects’ private knowledge 
about each other alone for obtaining treatment effects.  
 
Hypotheses 
For obtaining testable predictions, we reason from the insight that civil war has created 
new social categories: ex-combatants and civilians, of various types. These categories add 
aspects to people’s social identity that did not exist prior to the conflict. In the case of 
northern Uganda, as we will see, these aspects are largely orthogonal to people’s pre-
conflict social identity: there is no correlation with ethnicity, religion or socio-economic 
status. After the conflict has ended, when people with various conflict roles form a 
community, these conflict-related aspects join other aspects of social identity, as well as 
personal characteristics, in informing attitudes towards other community members. 
In the language of the influential social identity theory of intergroup behaviour and 
conflict developed by Tajfel & Turner (1979, 1986), new in-groups and outgroups have 
been formed as a result of the conflict. The more salient the conflict-related aspects of 
social identity are, the greater the extent to which dealings with others will be influenced 
by their conflict roles as opposed to their other group memberships and personal 
characteristics. Because of these newly created groups or categories, there is thus a new 
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potential for “categorical thinking”: the tendency to attribute category characteristics to 
oneself and/or others. In social identity theory, to the extent that self-esteem correlates 
positively with group membership, the in-group will be more favourably treated than the 
outgroup in interpersonal relations: in-group favouritism. However, under certain 
conditions outgroup favouritism may occur, most significantly when members of a 
derogated group have internalised the esteem in which their group is held by other groups 
and believe boundaries between groups to be permeable (ibid.). 
In the case of northern Uganda, again as will be seen, the derogated group is clear: those 
who were abducted by the rebel movement, forced to join their forces and returned to their 
original communities after the conflict ended. Although they are not explicitly blamed, 
they are the perpetrators of the devastating violence that paralysed northern Uganda for 
more than two decades; even if they are not held responsible for it, their presence in the 
communities represents the cause of the recent misery. Our first prediction is thus that other 
community members will display in-group favouritism and discriminate against the 
outgroup when it comes to their dealings with those abducted and who were forced to join 
the rebels.  
Hypothesis 1: Abductees who were forced to join the rebels, are discriminated against 
by other community members. 
In this particular context, the investigation of in-group favouritism and discrimination 
against the outgroup may be refined. A substantial proportion of northern Uganda’s current 
population were also abducted by the rebels, but were then, within the next few days or at 
most a couple of weeks, released (some escaped). We postulate that those abducted but 
deselected would gain empathy from their own experience with those abducted and forced 
to be rebels. The process of othering, or in terms of social identity theory, the salience of 
the relevant outgroup characteristics will diminish accordingly. Our second prediction is 
thus that “short-term abductees” will show less in-group favouritism and discrimination of 
the outgroup in their dealings with “long-term abductees” than other community members 
will. 
Hypothesis 2: Short-term abductees discriminate long-term abductees less than other 
community members do. 
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For reasons alluded to above, whether or not the long-term abductees themselves will 
show in-group favouritism in their dealings with others is theoretically ambiguous. If they 
believe that boundaries between groups are not permeable, then a plausible strategy is to 
reject the low esteem in which they are held by others. In that case, we would expect them 
to show in-group favouritism. By contrast, if they believe that the conflict-related aspect 
of their social identity has become insignificant – stopped being salient in how they are 
regarded and regard themselves – then no in-group favouritism should be expected. Finally, 
if they believe that this aspect of their identity is still salient but may stop being so if they 
show goodwill to others, then outgroup favouritism is a possibility (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 
1979: 43-46).  
 
Setting and methods 
This study was located in northern Uganda where from the late 1980s, the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) have plagued the majority Acholi population of the region.  
Operating from bases in southern Sudan, raiding parties would cross the border into 
northern Uganda, attack homesteads, usually at night, and take all residents, as well as the 
loot that could be carried.4 This indiscriminate short-term abduction, typically for no more 
than a couple of weeks at most, was followed by a selection process whereby some 
abductees would be retained by the LRA and others would be released (some escaped). 
Individuals retained would primarily be adolescents and young males who would become 
soldiers, but males and females of all but the most extreme age groups would also be 
retained to become porters, cleaners, cooks or “wives” (Annan & Blattman, 2010).  
Individuals who avoided LRA abduction were nonetheless significantly affected by the 
conflict, as from 1996 onwards the army started moving the rural population of northern 
Uganda into camps, in part as a counter-insurgency strategy (“draining the pond to catch 
the fish”), in part for their protection. At its peak in 2005, there were 1.84 million people 
or ~90% of the rural population living in such Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. 
Although no formal peace agreement was signed, the relocation of the LRA to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 2006 onwards improved the security 
situation and began to allow the camps’ populations to return home. By 2010, the UNHCR 
                                                 
4
 For a fuller account of the LRA insurgency, see for instance Allen & Vlassenroot (2010). 
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had reported that virtually all of the IDPs and abductees who had not perished had returned 
to their villages of origin, now with a variety of conflict-affected pasts (IDMC, 2010; 
UNHCR, 2012).  
Three distinct categories of conflict participation were thus created. The first category 
consists of those abducted by the LRA and then selected for membership, to be a soldier 
or to play another role it deemed useful. Once abductees were selected for membership, 
they would usually stay with the LRA for years. We call those long-term abductees (LTA). 
The second category consists of those abducted by the LRA, but then de-selected. We 
will call these short-term abductees (STA). Their release would usually happen when the 
LRA reached a secure location where the sorting could take place undisturbed; often within 
a few days but always within a couple of weeks after the initial abduction. Since no LTA 
would stay with the LRA for less than a month, we imposed that as a cut-off point to 
distinguish between STA and LTA. The STA category is similar to the LTA category in 
one respect only: its initial traumatic abduction experience, which we hypothesise would 
lead to facilitate empathy with the LTA. In all other respects, they are similar to the next 
category: they would eventually, along with everybody else who were never abducted, be 
resettled by the army (Joireman, Sawyer & Wilhoit, 2012). 
The third category, the IDPs, experienced forced displacement, as well as the hardship 
of living in insecure and unsanitary camps, but were never abducted by the LRA.  
The way in which the civil war created these three categories of people is outlined in 
Figure 1. Crucially, these categories have no basis in pre-conflict social identity. The 
uniform poverty of the area (i.e. no obvious wealth differences), the spatial arrangements 
of Acholi villages (i.e. households dwelling in the midst of their fields rather than in 
nucleated villages), the absence of rugged or other features of the terrain that make some 
parts easier to traverse than others, and the element of surprise and unpredictability that the 
LRA relied on for its success, meant that the likelihood of a household being attacked was 
not influenced by its characteristics. This is supported by studies that have examined 
households’ pre-war traits and by interviews with former LRA officers (Blattman & 
Annan, 2010). The indiscriminate nature of these LRA abductions has been characterised 
as a “tragic natural experiment” (Blattman, 2009: 231); the randomness of it has been used 
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to identify the effect of violence on social, political and economic outcomes at the level of 
the individual abductee (Blattman, 2009; Blattman & Annan, 2010). 
For our purposes, the indiscriminate nature of LRA abduction means that the effect of 
conflict on post-conflict discrimination can be more clearly seen. Usual confounds such as 
ethnicity, religion or (pre-conflict) socio-economic status have played no role in the 
intergroup conflict in northern Uganda and are thus uncorrelated with new post-conflict 
aspects of social identity. At the same time, it is clear that the young were preferred to the 
old, and among the young, males to females, by the LRA: we control for age and gender 
in the analysis. In addition, selection on fitness for combat and health, possibly among 
other factors, will probably have taken place, for which we cannot control. Whereas such 
unobserved selection effects are in principle a concern for causal inference, their role is 
likely to be limited. The main advantage that the setting of northern Uganda offers for the 
purpose of this study is that conflict roles in its recently ended civil war had no basis in 
pre-conflict religious, ethnic or socio-economic identity. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Assignment to conflict role 
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Data collection methods 
Data collection took place in 2012, between two and three years after the return of the 
displaced and abducted populations. Based on key informant interviews, we selected a sub-
county, Mucwini, in the district of Kitgum, one of the three districts in which the LRA has 
been most active. The sub-county is sufficiently remote from Kitgum Trading Centre to 
encourage a tendency for village residents to primarily have relationships with each other 
– villages are socially integral. Mucwini has an estimated adult population of 9,831 divided 
over 79 villages in nine parish areas (UBoS, 2006) from which we selected, through 
implementing a multistage, stratified sampling design, 303 adults (18+) to be 
representative for the sub-county, as follows. For matching purposes, we ensured equal 
numbers in each of the three conflict categories described previously: Long Term Abductee 
(LTA), Short Term Abductee (STA) and IDP. The implementation of the sampling strategy 
is described in the online appendix. 
In each of the nine parishes we organised one “game day”, on consecutive days. All 
subjects played two games: a ‘dictator’ game and a ‘cooperation’ game, in each of which 
they were matched in successive rounds with a number of other players. After the games, 
subjects were invited to complete the social tie, socio-economic and conflict history 
surveys. The dictator game – whereby one player dictates the earnings of themselves and 
their nominated partner – has been widely used in behavioural economics since the early 
1980s (Kahneman et al., 1986; Werner et al., 1982) and more recently in a number of post-
conflict scenarios (e.g. Whitt & Wilson, 2007; Voors et al., 2012). The game is a one-stage 
game in which a participant (Player 1) decides how to divide an endowment between 
themselves and another participant (Player 2).  If the dictator is not interested in the 
wellbeing of the other player, as well as remains anonymous, there is no reason why Player 
1 should diminish their own earnings by offering anything at all to Player 2.  However, a 
considerable body of research has shown that dictators generally transfer a non-trivial sum 
to their partner under a wide variety of experimental conditions (see the review in Camerer, 
2003, and the meta study of Engel, 2011).  
Dictator games originated as a means of observing the other-regarding preferences of 
individuals (altruism, etc.), although they have been increasingly used to measure 
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perceptions of fairness as well as attitudes of discrimination (Berg et al., 1995; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Cox, 2004; Frohlich, 2004). Since our interest is in a measure of goodwill 
towards other community members, we needed to ensure that the potential influence of 
reciprocity is minimised. We therefore imposed one-sided anonymity. In particular, we 
endowed Player 1, the dictator, with 10,000 shillings, 2.5 times the local daily wage, which 
they could divide as they wished between themselves and Player 2, whose identity was 
revealed to Player 1 but not vice versa. 
The ‘co-operation’ game used in this study is adapted from well-known public goods 
games that have been in use for more than twenty years (Sugden, 1984; Ledyard, 1995).  
Essentially, public goods games capture a social dilemma: choose to act co-operatively at 
a personal cost or selfishly at a societal cost, i.e. ‘defect’ or free-ride on the efforts of others. 
Public goods games have been used in a variety of situations to explore the willingness of 
individuals to act collectively under a range of experimental conditions (Andreoni, 1995; 
Anderson et al., 1998; Brandts & Schram, 2001; Levitt & List, 2007). Here, we think of it 
primarily as measuring willingness to cooperate with community members variously 
implicated in a recently ended conflict.  
To reduce confusion amongst participants, as well as avoid problems relating to 
reciprocity, the public goods game used in the study is limited to a simple interaction 
between two partnered individuals who must both choose how much of a given endowment 
they wish to keep for themselves and how much they would like to contribute to a collective 
‘investment’.  Players 1 and 2 are told each other’s identity and decide, without 
communication, how much of their individual endowment of 5,000 shillings to contribute 
to a common investment that earns 50% profit before being split equally between them. 
Clearly, if both players do not cooperate, each is worse off than if both had cooperated, but 
no matter what the other player does, each individual player is best off in monetary terms 
by not contributing anything. 
Each subject played each game three times non-anonymously, each time matched with 
somebody from their own village with a different conflict history. This is the dyadic feature 
that, combined with matching on conflict role, distinguishes our study from previous ones. 
As is standard, only one decision is randomly selected for payment, after all decisions have 
been taken; subjects know this beforehand, so will consider each decision independently 
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and knowing that it could be the selected one. All pairings, decision sequences and the 
ordering of the games were randomised too. As detailed in the online appendix, neither 
subjects nor experiment instructors were made aware of conflict roles or reasons for 
pairing: the names by which subjects had introduced themselves at the beginning of a 
session were used throughout. No explicit effort was thus made in the experimental 
sessions to render conflict roles salient, and any effect of being formerly in conflict on 
current sharing or cooperation in the matched pairs would derive from subjects’ private 
knowledge of each other’s history.  
Following completion of the games, a survey was conducted which collected socio-
economic, attitudinal and social tie information about each participant; the information 
from the first two would be used as controls in the analysis of the games data, whereas the 
information on social ties provides the basis for complementary investigations. 
 
Table I. Demographic and socio-economic characteristics and exposure to violence, by category 
 Total IDP  STA LTA Comparison a 
 N = 275 N = 92 N = 92 N = 91 IDP – STA IDP-LTA STA-LTA 
Age 36.90 39.22 39.26 32.46 -0.05 (2.51) 
6.76** 
(2.16) 
6.80** 
(2.10) 
Male (%) 53.26 48.91 44.57 65.93 4.35   (7.35) -17.02*   (7.20) 
-21.37**   
(7.18) 
Education 4.41 4.02 4.18 5.04 -0.16    (0.54) 
-1.02    
(0.56) 
-0.86    
(0.57) 
Wealth 0.00 -0.04 -0.14 0.18 0.10    (0.23) 
-0.22    
(0.24) 
-0.32     
(0.22) 
Attend community 
meeting (%) 62.27 61.11 60.44 64.84 0.67   (7.26) 
-3.72   
(7.17) 
-4.40    
(7.16) 
# of group 
memberships 2.99 2.91 2.87 3.22 
0.04    
(0.49) 
-0.31    
(0.51) 
-0.35     
(0.45) 
Threatened with 
weapon (%) 62.91 48.35 56.52 83.52 
-8.17   
(7.36) 
-35.16**   
(6.52) 
-26.99**   
(6.47) 
Attacked with 
weapon (%) 41.30 26.09 38.04 60.44 
-11.96 
(6.82) 
-34.35**   
(6.87) 
-22.40**   
(7.20) 
Beaten (%) 53.62 31.52 56.52 73.63 -25.00**   (7.08) 
-42.10**   
(6.69) 
-17.10*   
(6.93) 
Lost body part (%) 6.88 6.52 3.26 9.89 3.26   (3.17) -3.37   (4.05) 
-6.63*   
(3.64) 
a
 Independent samples t-tests and proportion tests were used for continuous variables and dichotomous 
variables, respectively. Mean differences and standard error (between brackets) reported. **, * indicate 
significance levels at 1 and 5 percent, respectively. 
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Results 
In this section we present the empirical results.5 We will start with an analysis of the survey 
data, presenting descriptive statistics of important demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics as well as conflict exposure of the three different groups. In a next step, we 
will look at within-village social ties among the participants and whether there are any 
noticeable differences across (dyadic combinations of) the three groups. Finally, we 
investigate the experimental data to test the role of conflict history on pro-social behaviour. 
For this, we use a regression framework, which allows us to control for potential 
confounding factors, some of them identified by the descriptive analysis and the analysis 
of social ties. 
Individual characteristics of respondents 
We first examine the average demographic characteristics of the various groups within our 
sample (Table 1). As would be expected given the nature of the LRA abduction process, 
we find that LTA are on average younger and more likely to be male than STA (and IDP), 
which confirms that young males were more often wanted by the LRA, as suggested before. 
We do not observe any significant differences in education or wealth.6 In addition, and in 
line with other surveys in post-conflict settings (Bellows & Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009), 
ex-combatants, here the LTA, are not less likely than others to be a member of community-
level organisations or attend community meetings. Finally, we observe that LTA were 
more exposed to violence than STA, and STA in turn more than IDP. This supports that 
the assignment by the local village leaders into the different categories was done correctly. 
 
Social ties 
In a next step, we analyse social ties among the different categories, as captured by the 
social tie survey (STS) that was conducted after the experiments were completed. Table 2 
                                                 
5
 We did not deposit a pre-analysis plan in the public domain.  
6
 To construct the wealth index we used a list of assets held by the individual as recorded in the survey. The 
index is formed by using the first principal component scores obtained with a principal components analysis. 
For a more technical exposition of this approach see Montgomery et al. (2000). 
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presents the frequencies of social ties among the different categories. P1 refers to the 
respondent and P2 refers to the village member the social relation question is asked about. 
The percentages need to be interpreted as the percentage of dyads with P2 in which P1 
reported a social tie. We focus on two types of social ties: friendship ties and ties that result 
from participating in the same social group. Our specific interest is in whether such ties are 
less frequent for the LTA than for others. 
Looking at the friendship ties (panel a), we find that IDP tend to be somewhat less 
connected than LTA and STA, as indicated by the lower frequencies in the row with P1 = 
IDP and/or the column with P2 = IDP. The differences in frequencies, however, are not 
very substantial, and neither is the statistical significance of the differences. The most 
statistically significant difference is between P2 = IDP and P2 = LTA for the sample of all 
P1 (first row). On this evidence, LTA are if anything more likely than others to have friends 
within the community. Moreover, there is no evidence that members from other groups 
shun them in friendship relations. 
 
     
   
Table II. Social ties within and across conflict categories  
 
 P2 Comparison a 
 Any P2 STA LTA IDP 
IDP – 
STA 
IDP-LTA 
STA-
LTA 
a. Friend        
P1 
Any P1 35.60% 36.58% 36.92% 33.09% 0.050 0.039 0.812 
LTA 37.58% 38.08% 39.85% 35.18% 0.697 0.645 0.396 
STA 36.22% 38.79% 37.40% 32.92% 0.374 0.314 0.823 
IDP 32.87% 33.33% 34.08% 30.79% 0.102 0.092 0.459 
b. Group        
P1 
Any P1 33.81% 33.50% 36.26% 31.78% 0.815 0.159 0.002 
LTA 35.54% 34.82% 39.30% 33.20% 0.602 0.822 0.055 
STA 34.65% 35.64% 36.44% 32.06% 0.876 0.606 0.196 
IDP 31.35% 30.44% 33.60% 29.70% 0.648 0.258 0.546 
a
 Two-sided p-values of Wald test adjusted for multiple observations per P1. 
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Looking at panel b, which presents the frequencies of connections via group 
membership, we again find that IDP are somewhat less connected than LTA and STA, as 
indicated by the lower frequencies in the row with P1 = IDP and/or the column with P2 = 
IDP. We also observe that LTA tend to be more connected than STA. On this evidence, 
LTA are if anything more likely to belong to groups.  
We thus conclude that in terms of both types of ties considered, the LTA are at least as 
connected as the other categories, both in the aggregate and with each of the other 
categories in the community. 
 
Table III. Sharing and cooperation decisions by category of P2 
 P2 Comparison a 
 IDP STA LTA 
IDP – 
STA 
IDP-
LTA 
STA-
LTA 
Dictator game 
(sharing) 
2,557 
(2215) 
2,713 
(2,246) 
2,274 
(2,142) 
0.239 0.070 0.003 
N = 273 N = 275 N = 272    
Public goods game 
(cooperation) 
2,396 
(1,546) 
2,422 
(1,523) 
2,125 
(1,513) 
0.776 0.005 0.003 
N = 275 N = 275 N = 272    
Mean decision made by person 1 by category of person 2. Standard deviation between brackets. a Paired 
samples t-tests for pairwise comparison of means. Two-sided p-values reported. 
 
Experimental data 
Finally, we look at the decisions made in the two experimental games. Table 3 presents the 
average amount shared in the dictator game and amount contributed in the public goods 
game, disaggregated by the category of P2. Here P1 refers to the decision maker and P2 to 
the paired person. On average about 25 percent of the initial endowment of 10,000 shillings 
was shared in the dictator game, and about 45 percent of the available 5,000 shillings 
contributed in the public goods game. Comparing the average amount shared or contributed 
across the different categories of P2, we find that the LTA receive 2,274 shillings on 
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average in the dictator game, which is 16.2 percent less than what the STA on average 
receive, and 11.2 percent less than the IDP.  
In the public goods game, players paired with an LTA contribute 2,125 shillings on 
average, or 12.3 percent less than what the STA on average experience and 11.3 percent 
less than the IDP. In the pairwise comparison LTA versus STA, the difference in sharing 
experienced of 439 shillings is statistically significant as well as the difference in 
cooperation experienced of 297 shillings; in the pairwise comparison LTA versus IDP, the 
same is the case for cooperation (contribution is a statistically significant 271 shillings 
lower when matched with LTA) although not for sharing. 
To test our two hypotheses, we estimate the following regression model: 
 =  + (P2	 = 	LTA)+ (P2	 = 	IDP)+	 +	 +  
We include two dummy variables in the regressions that control for two of the three 
categories of the matched person (P2), using the STA category as reference category, hence 
omitted. The coefficient on LTA is the central coefficient of interest, which should thus be 
interpreted as the extra sharing/cooperation experienced by the abductees who became 
LRA members compared to the abductees who shortly after their abduction were released, 
so never joined the LRA. Recall that hypothesis 1 states that LTA are discriminated against 
by other community members. This would be confirmed in the empirical analysis if in the 
P1=STA and/or P1=IDP regressions, the coefficient on LTA is negative and statistically 
significant. Stated more fully, if in either of these two separate regressions for the other 
community members as Player 1 (a regression for the STA and a regression for the IDP) 
the coefficient on LTA is negative, then this points to discrimination by the category of 
other community members whose Player 1 behaviour is studied in that regresssion. 
Hypothesis 2 offers a refinement and states that STA discriminate against LTA less than 
the IDP do. We evaluate this hypothesis by comparing the coefficient on LTA across the 
P1=STA and P1=IDP regressions. 
To limit omitted variable bias, we include a vector of control variables, represented by 
the vector . More specifically, we control for gender, age, education and wealth of the 
matched person P2. To control for all (observed and unobserved) characteristics of person 
P1, we include individual fixed effects, represented by the term   (making use of the 
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within-subject experimental design). Given the potential influence of social ties on pro-
social behavior (on this see e.g. Leider et al., 2009; Ligon & Schechter, 2012) and its 
correlation with conflict categories (see Table 2), we also control for the existence of a  
social tie between P1 and P2 (as reported by P1). Finally,  captures any remaining 
idiosyncratic error. We applied robust standard errors clustered at the village level so as to 
conservatively account for possible non-independencies within villages and experimental 
sessions (we conducted only one session per village). 
Table 4 presents the estimates of the regressions for the public goods (models 1-4) and 
the dictator game (models 5-8); as mentioned, the public goods game measures cooperation 
behaviour, the dictator game sharing behaviour. We use the pooled sample (models 1 and 
5) and different subsamples for each category of P1, which allows us to identify differences 
across types of dyads (i.e. P1 and P2 combinations), needed to test our predictions. 
 
Table IV. Sharing and cooperation within and across conflict categories 
 -------------- Public goods game (cooperation)------- -------------- Dictator game (sharing)--- 
 Pooled 
P1 = 
STA 
P1 = 
LTA 
P1 = IDP Pooled 
P1 = 
STA 
P1 = 
LTA 
P1 = 
IDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
P2 = LTA -253.7** -419.8** -141.6 -187.3 -443.8** -162.3 -673.2 -529.7* 
 
(86.7) (116.6) (183.4) (231.8) (135.2) (368.9) (358.2) (226.7) 
P2 = IDP -10.6 22.0 -99.4 40.0 -187.7 239.3 -474.7 -341.8 
 
(109.7) (147.5) (210.7) (203.1) (168.6) (270.2) (332.8) (184.3) 
Age P2 3.8 3.8 2.6 4.0 -5.6 0.6 -8.4 -10.3 
 
(3.3) (5.5) (8.0) (5.1) (4.5) (10.9) (9.2) (10.5) 
Female P2 276.1 538.0** 207.1 107.2 75.5 491.5 132.4 -431.1 
 
(133.3) (163.9) (162.2) (263.3) (164.3) (275.1) (393.3) (298.8) 
Education P2 42.1 54.2* 29.9 38.6 -17.9 25.4 -24.2 -56.6 
 
(20.5) (22.6) (30.5) (30.8) (24.5) (33.5) (53.5) (34.8) 
Wealth P2 -6.4 -24.5 -48.4 50.3 56.5 5.7 120.0 25.5 
 
(49.4) (68.5) (90.1) (58.0) (45.4) (70.6) (85.6) (68.4) 
Friend = 1 110.9 135.6 223.8 -72.1 290.5 433.3 493.5 47.6 
 
(118.9) (224.7) (250.8) (266.6) (170.3) (268.1) (517.2) (380.1) 
Constant 1923.9** 1773.1** 1975.2** 2060.3** 2818.8** 1927.7** 3163.5** 3399.3** 
 
(205.8) (301.1) (413.7) (439.5) (242.7) (535.2) (548.5) (453.9) 
Observations 759 256 247 256 737 249 239 249 
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R-squared 0.045 0.144 0.025 0.029 0.026 0.050 0.051 0.049 
F 3.079 8.664 0.434 0.885 2.162 1.118 1.312 1.837 
Fixed effects regressions with controls for age, gender, education and wealth of person 2. P2 = STA used as reference 
category. Standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. **, * indicate significance levels at 1 and 5 percent, 
respectively. 
 
Looking at the results of the pooled sample we find similar results for both games. In 
the public goods game (model 1) the coefficient of ‘P2 = LTA’ is statistically significant, 
and its sign and size indicate that P1 contributes on average 253.7 less when P2 is an LTA 
than when P2 is an STA. The coefficient of ‘P2 = IDP’ is not statistically significant, which 
indicates that P1 tends to contribute similarly when matched with IDP as when matched 
with STA. In the dictator game (model 5) again the estimated coefficient of ‘P2 = LTA’ is 
statistically significant. Participants tend to share 443.8 less when matched with an LTA 
than when matched with an STA. The coefficient of ‘P2 = IDP’ is not statistically 
significant, which indicates that P1 tends to share similarly with IDP as with STA. 
Because of the dyadic element of our games, we are able to examine who is 
generous/cooperative towards whom.7 For this, we look at the estimates of the subsamples 
which allow us to identify which category of P1 drives the observed lower sharing and 
cooperation with LTA. For the public goods game, we find that all three categories tend to 
contribute less when matched with LTA than with STA. The negative coefficient on LTA 
in the P1=STA and the P1= IDP regressions are consistent with hypothesis 1, according to 
which other community members discriminate against LTA. However, only for decision 
makers who are STA (model 2) is the coefficient of ‘P2 = LTA’ statistically significant. 
This indicates that the lower contributions with LTA are driven by STA, a rejection of 
hypothesis 2, which expects a greater willingness to cooperate with the LTA among the 
STA than among the IDP. In shillings, STA tend to contribute 419.9 less when matched 
with LTA, compared to when matched with STA.8 The coefficient of ‘P2 = IDP’ is not 
statistically significant in any of the subsamples, which indicates that all categories 
contribute similarly when matched with IDP as with STA.  
                                                 
7
 This involves multiple comparisons, and therefore a possible inflation of a type 1 error. Rather than using 
Bonferroni corrections – which tend to be too conservative – we focus instead on the most statistically 
significant results. 
8
 The next mentioned finding rules out that this is an in-group effect: STA do not favour themselves over 
IDP, only over LTA. 
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For the dictator game, we find that all three categories tend to share less with LTA than 
with STA, but that only for decision makers who are IDP (model 8) the difference is 
statistically significant. More specifically, IDP share on average 529.7 shillings less with 
LTA than with STA. We thus find support for both hypotheses 1 and 2 in the dictator game: 
other community members share less with the LTA than with others (hypothesis 1), but 
this lack of sharing is attenuated when the dictator is an STA (hypothesis 2). The coefficient 
of ‘P2 = IDP’ is not statistically significant in any of the subsamples, which indicates that 
all categories treat IDP similarly to STA.  
A succinct way of summarising the results from both games is to say that STA 
discriminate against LTA in cooperation (and only against LTA), whereas IDP 
discriminate against LTA in sharing (and only against LTA). 
What do these results tell us about the predictions from social identity theory arrived 
at above? For both sharing and cooperation, we find support for our first prediction 
(hypothesis 1): LTA are discriminated against. They receive less in the dictator game than 
others do, which is driven by the sharing behaviour of the IDP; and less money is 
committed to cooperation with the LTA, which is driven by the behaviour of the STA. Our 
second prediction (hypothesis 2), according to which STA discriminate less against LTA 
than the IDP do, is supported when it comes to sharing behaviour: lower sharing with the 
LTA in the dictator games is driven by the behaviour of the IDP. However, our second 
prediction is contradicted in the public goods games: STA discriminate more against LTA 
in cooperation than the IDP do. For LTA behaviour, social identity theory does not imply 
a clear-cut prediction, as explained above; both in-group and outgroup favouritism are 
possible, depending among other factors on the extent to which the derogated group 
identifies with the low esteem in which it is held by others. The negative sign of the 
coefficients on ‘P2 = LTA’ in the two ‘P1 = LTA’ models (models 3 and 7) are consistent 
with outgroup favouritism; but they are not statistically significant. At any rate, there is no 
evidence of in-group favouritism among the LTA, nor of discrimination by them against 
either of the other two categories. We will next reflect on these patterns of discrimination. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
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A civil war creates new social categories, new aspects of social identity. When arms have 
been laid down, these conflict-related aspects of social identity remain. To the extent that 
they remain salient, social identity theory of intergroup behaviour predicts discrimination 
against those whose conflict roles place them in the derogated social category: the long-
term abductees in northern Uganda.  
We find in a survey that long-term abductees are at least as often active members of 
community organisations, and at least as often reported to be friends. Social ties exist 
abundantly among them and exist as frequently as they do for others with those outside 
their own group. However, in behavioural experiments, other community members are less 
likely to be cooperative or generous towards them: averaged across all community 
members, about 15 percent fewer resources are committed to long-term abductees in each 
of these acts, which is statistically significant (Table 4, columns 1 and 5). A lingering 
distaste for cooperating and sharing with former enemies is thus detected that was not 
detected through a survey. 
In the context of the recently ended civil war in northern Uganda, a newly acquired post-
conflict social identity is the most plausible factor responsible for the discrimination of ex-
combatants. Our reasons for concluding this are (a) that the post-conflict social identity of 
the former rebels has no basis in pre-conflict social identity, which follows from the nature 
of the LRA abduction process, as argued above; and (b) that previous research does not 
support for this setting any of the other major explanations for discrimination reported for 
other settings in studies of post-conflict social reintegration, as we will argue next. 
The literature on post-conflict social reintegration suggests three major explanations for 
discrimination of ex-combatants: they are blamed, they have changed or they are resented. 
As to the first explanation, ex-combatants are often found to be stereotyped or otherwise 
negatively labelled because of their violent past (e.g. Muggah, 2005). However, former 
LRA members were welcomed back first by their families and next by the wider 
communities, with very high rates of acceptance reported (Annan et al., 2007). A key factor 
appears to have been widespread recognition that they were not abducted by choice and 
therefore not to blame for their violent behaviour.  
The second explanation, by which ex-combatants have become different persons 
because of their implication in violence that affects their interaction with others, is 
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controversial in northern Uganda, with studies reaching different conclusions about the 
extent to which ex-LRA members have been negatively affected in their capacity to 
function as effective community members (Pham & Vinck, 2010). The study of Blattman 
& Annan (2010) and the studies cited therein point to remarkable trauma-induced 
psychological growth and conclude that post-traumatic stress disorder was found among a 
comparatively small group of former abductees and not disproportionately frequently in 
this group, whereas Derluyn et al. (2004) report for this group almost universal post-
traumatic stress symptoms of clinical importance.9 But whatever the true psychological 
damage may be of their conflict history, ex-LRA members are more than others active in 
their community (Blattman, 2009), so it would be difficult to uphold an account of their 
discrimination that rests on them being “anti-social”. 
A third possible interpretation of our findings, that ex-combatants are resented for the 
official help they receive, which is often found elsewhere (Blattman, 2010) is implausible 
in northern Uganda: material support was sparse for ex-combatants and IDPs alike.10  
Since blame, changed characters or resentment do not provide a convincing rationale 
for discrimination, it is thus plausible that the discrimination we found evidence for is a 
“pure” bias against the outgroup. The evidence thereby provides support for a key 
prediction of social identity theory of intergroup behaviour and conflict: the social category 
“ex-combatant”, irrespective of other motives for discrimination, labels a derogated group 
that is likely to suffer from discrimination. The new derogated group created by the conflict 
consists in this context of ex-LRA members, or long-term abductees. The discrimination 
resulting from the new label is clear to see since there are no obvious other motives for 
discrimination, nor does the label correspond with a pre-conflict social identity. 
How should the particular pattern of discrimination we found be interpreted? The 
dictator game measures how kindly disposed towards ex-combatants other people are. 
Those who were themselves briefly abducted do not discriminate against the long-term 
abductees in the dictator games; those who were never abducted do. This suggests both 
that the long-term abductees are regarded as an outgroup and that sharing the abduction 
                                                 
9
 See also Pham, Vinck & Stover (2009) for evidence that forced abduction is a significant factor in how the 
LRA-led conflict has affected the psychological well-being of northern Ugandans. 
10
 Source: Interviews with village representatives from each of the participating villages in August 2012. 
23 
 
experience gave rise to empathy that reduces the salience of the outgroup characteristic 
“long-term abductee”. 
On the other hand, discrimination in the public goods game reflects a character 
assessment of the person one is paired with: how likely is it that they will cooperate? We 
found that short-term abductees discriminate against long-term abductees in the public 
goods games. This suggests that they are unaware of the actual willingness to cooperate of 
the long-term abductees. This is supported by the findings of Bauer et al. (2015), who 
report similar ignorance of the trustworthiness of ex-LRA members. The exception to this 
general pattern they report is for those who know the ex-LRA members well (as their sons). 
The absence of discrimination of the ex-LRA members in the public goods games that we 
found by those who were never themselves abducted thus suggests that the latter assess 
correctly that the former are cooperative. 
Ex-LRA members themselves do not display in the experiments statistically significant 
in-group nor outgroup favouritism. In terms of social identity theory of intergroup 
behaviour and conflict, this suggests that they believe that the conflict-related aspects of 
their social identity have become insignificant (in marked contrast to what other 
community members believe about them). The widely promoted and apparently embraced 
reconciliation thus appears to have been taken, by former rebels, at face value; the 
discrimination against them that we found evidence of in the experiments may be an 
unacknowledged undercurrent: unconsciously held attitudes towards the former rebels by 
other community members. 
To conclude, our analysis shows the value of combining behavioural experiments and a 
social tie survey for studying post-conflict social reintegration. Whereas the social tie 
survey shows the reported connections between former enemies (as friends, as members of 
the same social group), behavioural experiments detect possibly unconsciously held 
attitudes towards former enemies. Knowing whether connections such as friendship and 
group membership are reported to exist is not enough: there may be lingering animosity 
under the surface, which experiments can uncover. 
 
Data replication 
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The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article can be found 
at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets. 
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